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Arbitration is now widely accepted as a legitimate alternative to
judicial dispute resolution. During the last decade, the Supreme
Court has expanded the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),I
which compels all courts to enforce private arbitration agreements,
2
to create a general presumption of arbitrability and has circum-
scribed the possibilities for rebutting this presumption.' The Court
has applied the presumption to a wide range of disputes, primarily
those arising in commercial contexts, and has found them amenable
to resolution in arbitral fora.4
This Comment questions whether the presumption of arbi-
trability should extend to disputes involving discrimination claims.
The Court has yet to address this question outside of the context of
collective bargaining, where it has established that discrimination
actions in court are not precluded by arbitration agreements. Using
age discrimination in employment as an example, this Comment con-
cludes that discrimination claims should be distinguished from com-
mercial claims and exempted from the presumption of arbitrability.
In Nicholson v. CPC International, Inc., 5 a case of first impression
t B.A. 1970, New York University; M.S.W. 1972, Smith College; J.D. 0andidate
1991, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Nancy Winkelman for
graciously providing the space and for expertly providing the guidance that made
this Comment possible.
1 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988).
2 See idL § 2.
3 See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct.
1917, 1921 (1989) (noting that "the party opposing arbitration carries the burden of
showing that Congress intended in a separate statute to preclude a waiver ofjudicial
remedies, or that such a waiver of judicial remedies inherently conflicts with the
underlying purposes of that other statute").
4 See id. (holding a predispute agreement to arbitrate claims under the Securities
Act of 1933 enforceable); Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220, 242 (1987) (finding claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and RICO
arbitrable under the FAA); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985) (finding Sherman Act claims arising out of an international
commercial transaction arbitrable under the FAA).
5 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989) (Sloviter,J.).
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on the federal appellate level,' the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit held that an employee may bring a claim under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 7 against his
employer in a judicial forum despite their agreement to submit all
disputes to arbitration. 8  Applying the test developed by the
Supreme Court for rebutting the presumption of arbitrability, the
court concluded that the ADEA preempts the FAA.9 The reasoning
of the court additionally suggests that the presumption of arbi-
trability should not be construed to reach the discrimination laws.
In a series of cases interpreting and applying the FAA, the
Supreme Court has declared that the FAA creates a national policy in
favor of arbitration' ° and a presumption that federal statutory rights
are subject to arbitration." With regard to the policy preference,
the Court has proscribed judicial questioning of the competence of
arbitrators to handle even the most complex cases or to vindicate
substantive statutory rights. 12 The Court has held that the presump-
tion of arbitrability may be overcome only if a party is able to demon-
strate that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of a judicial
forum under the substantive statute, or if arbitration is inherently
inconsistent with the purposes of the substantive statute.' Applying
6 See id. at 222.
7 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (198! & Supp. V 1988).
8 See Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 222.
9 See id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has recently
come to the opposite conclusion. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895
F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1990).
10 See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983); see also Southland Corp. v. *Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1984) (stating that the
enforcement of arbitration clauses is determined by the FAA in state court actions).
II See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
626 (1985).
12 See Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232-33
(1987).
13 See id. at 226-27. The McMahon court stated:
The Arbitration Act, standing alone, therefore mandates enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims. Like any statutory directive, the
Arbitration Act's mandate may be overridden by a contrary congressional
command. The burden is on the party opposing arbitration, however, to
show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver ofjudicial remedies for
the statutory rights at issue.
Id.; see also Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628 ("[I]fCongress intended the substantive protec-
tion afforded by a given statute to include protection against waiver of the right to a
judicial forum, that intention will be deducible from [the statute's] text or legislative
history."). The McMahon Court explained that such intent could be deducible "from
an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying purposes."
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227 (citations omitted).
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these standards, the Court has held that claims arising under the
securities laws, 4 the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO), 5 and the antitrust laws'" are arbitrable. The
Court has suggested that virtually all federal statutory claims arising
in commercial contexts will be subject to the FAA. 7
Before these cases were decided, the Court had ruled in a series
of labor cases that the right to bring ajudicial action under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,18 the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA),' or the Civil Rights Act of 187120 is not subject to displace-
ment by arbitration.2 ' While such cases suggest that the Court
believes that discrimination claims should be treated differently from
commercial cases in assessing arbitrability, each involved arbitration
in the context of collective bargaining. In such circumstances, the
rights of individual employees legitimately may be subjugated to col-
lective interests, and the need to preserve an individual's right of
access to a judicial forum is more apparent than in other discrimina-
tion contexts. Additionally, none of these cases directly involved the
FAA.22 Moreover, each rested in part upon mistrust of arbitral com-
14 See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238.
15 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982); see McMahon, 482 U.S. at 242.
16 See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636-37.
17 See Shell, The Role of Public Law in Private Dispute Resolution: Reflections on
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 26 AM. Bus. LJ. 397, 397 (1988)
(noting that the Court's reasoning in McMahon "suggests that virtually all existing
federal statutory claims that arise in commercial contexts are subject to arbitration").
18 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
19 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
20 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
21 See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984) (§ 1983);
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981) (FLSA);
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974) (Title VII).
22 The collective bargaining arbitration cases came to the attention of the courts
pursuant to § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1982) (LMRA), which, like the FAA, creates jurisdiction for cases involving
violations of contract obligations. Professor Shell has pointed out that labor
arbitration under the LMRA has different purposes and procedures from commercial
arbitration under the FAA. See Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statutes:
When is Commercial Arbitration an "Adequate Substitute"for the Courts?, 68 Tax. L. REv.
509, 572 (1990). Rather than assessing the arbitrability of claims arising under
federal employment statutes outside of collective bargaining with reference to labor
arbitration precedent, Shell has suggested that the courts should determine "whether
the commercial arbitral forum is 'an adequate substitute' for the courts." Id. at 568
(quoting McMahon, 482 U.S. at 229). Applying this analysis, he has concluded that
there is an inherent conflict between the purposes of the ADEA and Title VII and
commercial arbitration under the FAA. See Shell, supra, at 566-72.
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petence. 23 As such, they have been discredited, though not over-
ruled, by the more recent cases.
Nevertheless, these labor cases may be read to support the prop-
osition that discrimination cases generally should be treated differ-
ently from cases arising in commercial contexts when a court is
determining arbitrability. Although the Supreme Court has not yet
examined this distinction, the most important among the labor cases,
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 24 may be read to satisfy the require-
ments the Court subsequently has established for rebutting the pre-
sumption of arbitrability.25 Following a similar analysis, the Nicholson
court concluded that age discrimination cases occurring outside of
collective bargaining should be treated differently from cases arising
in commercial contexts, and judicial fora should be reserved for such
claims.
26
A diminishing percentage of workers are covered by collective
bargaining agreements, 27 and the number of people in the forty-five
to sixty-five age range is expected to increase to more than sixty mil-
23 See McDonald, 466 U.S. at 290 ("An arbitrator may not... have the expertise
required to resolve the complex legal questions that arise in § 1983 actions."
(footnote omitted)); Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 743 ("These statutory questions must be
resolved in light of volumes of legislative history and over four decades of legal
interpretation and administrative rulings. Although an arbitrator may be competent
to resolve many preliminary factual questions . . . he may lack the competence to
decide the ultimate legal issue .... " (footnote omitted)); Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57
("[T]he specialized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the
shop, not the law of the land.... [I]he resolution of statutory or constitutional issues
is a primary responsibility of courts, and judicial construction has proved especially
necessary with respect to Title VIII, whose broad language frequently can be given
meaning only by reference to public law concepts." (citation omitted)).
24 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
25 The court claimed that:
mhe legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to
allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title
VII and other applicable state and federal statutes .... Title VII's purpose
and procedures strongly suggest that an individual does not forfeit his
private cause of action if he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration
under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining agreement.
Id. at 48-49 (footnote omitted).
26 See Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 224, 229 (noting the distinction between individual
contracts and those "entered into in a commercial context," as well as noting the
comparison to be made between the ADEA and both Title VII and the FLSA). The
enforcement provisions of the ADEA are modeled upon those of the FLSA, and
much of the ADEA's substantive language comes from Title VII. See infra notes 110-
15 and accompanying text.
27 See Swoboda, 2 Women Rise at AFL-CIO in a Sign of Labor's Times, Philadelphia
Inquirer, Jan. 4, 1990, at 10A, col. 2 (reporting that the percentage of the workforce
that belongs to unions has dropped from 23% to 17% in the last decade).
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lion by the year 2000.28 Additionally, there has been a dramatic
increase in the number of cases submitted to arbitration. 29 A deci-
sion by the Court to apply the presumption of arbitrability to dis-
crimination claims might significantly promote the proliferation of
arbitration agreements, many of which can be induced by the supe-
rior bargaining power of employers,30 thereby transferring enforce-
ment of the ADEA and other discrimination statutes from the public
to the private sector.
By proscribing any challenges to the competence of arbitrators,
the Supreme Court has ensured that its presumption of arbitrability
will be viewed primarily as a procedural development of the law,
whereby an arbitration clause represents a private decision to trans-
fer jurisdiction of a dispute to a private forum."' This development
concurrently serves the public function of easing congestion in the
courts. If one views the appropriate scope of arbitration more nar-
rowly, such developments represent the triumph of procedural val-
ues over substantive values such as nondiscrimination.3 2 As one
commentator has suggested, "[t]here are some disputes that truly
implicate core public concerns or involve parties whose bargaining
28 See Age Bias Claims Mount as Demographic, Legal, Economic Pressures Increase, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 53, at C-I (Mar. 19, 1985) ("Mhe number of employees
subject to the [ADEA's] protection is destined to increase dramatically. The Census
Bureau projects that the number of persons between the ages of 45 and 65-the key
ages in terms of ADEA activity today-will increase from 44 million today to more
than 60 million by the year 2000.").
29 See Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law,
71 VA. L. REv. 1305, 1305 n.7 (1985) (noting that since 1972 there has been a 70%
increase in the number of labor cases submitted to the American Arbitration
Association and a 250% increase in the number of commercial arbitration cases
submitted (citing American Arbitration Ass'n, Caseload Figures (1985))).
30 See Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 229.
31 The notion of "private decisions" suggests voluntary and knowing
transactions, free from government interference, and accepts disparity of bargaining
position as an inevitable and acceptable consequence of the free market system.
"[P]ublic pressure on choice is [seen as] coercion, private pressure is freedom."
Lesnick, The Consciousness of Work and the Values of American Labor Law (Book Review),
32 BUFFALO L. REv. 833, 845 (1983). Dissatisfaction with this unyielding principle of
freedom of contract has resulted in the creation of protective legislation in certain
areas, such as in employment discrimination. See id. at 846. Professor Lesnick,
however, suggests that such regulatory legislation is inconsistent with the prevailing
free market ideology, and that "[a]lthough those principles draw their legitimacy
from dissatisfaction with the results of the prevailing ideology, the ideology itself is
not rejected, and continues to shape our response." Id.
32 See Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007,
1093 (1989).
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position and knowledge are fundamentally unequal. In such cases,
arbitration is inappropriate.
' 33
In order to evaluate these issues, this Comment examines the
FAA, the ADEA, and their head-on collision in Nicholson. Part I
examines the FAA and the Supreme Court's development of the pre-
sumption of arbitrability. Fart II explores the question of the arbi-
trability of employment discrimination claims within the context of
collective bargaining and individual employment contracts, also
examining the history and content of the ADEA. Part III analyzes
the Nicholson opinion.
This Comment concludes that public policy strongly supports
the judiciary distinguishing discrimination claims from commercial
claims when considering the arbitrability of a dispute. Displacing the
judicial forum in favor of arbitration for discrimination claims may
discourage grievants from seeking relief, thus undermining the pur-
poses of the antidiscrimination statutes. Displacement of the judicial
forum also prevents the courts from articulating the norms and pub-
lic policies embodied in these statutes and from developing consis-
tent sources of case law that further these policies. For these
reasons, this Comment argues that discrimination statutes should be
presumed to override the FAA. This presumption would allow sub-
stantive public values, such as nondiscrimination, to prevail over
procedural values, such as arbitration.
I. THE FAA AND THE PRESUMPTION OF ARBITRABILrTY
In the last decade, :he Supreme Court has dramatically
expanded the scope of the FAA. It has unequivocally declared that
federal statutory claims are arbitrable under the FAA unless an
explicit or implicit abrogation can be found in another statute. The
Court has also stated that such an abrogation cannot be found on the
basis of challenges to the competence of arbitral tribunals.3 4 By pro-
scribing such challenges, the Court has rendered its presumption of
arbitrability practically unassailable.
33 T. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING THE LANCES
AND DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 136 (1989). Carbonneau notes further that "it is
inappropriate to respond to a situation in which access to justice is a problem by
making access completely impossible." Id.
34 See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
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A. The Purpose and Provisions of the FAA
In 1925 Congress passed the United States Arbitration Act,
3 5
commonly known as the Federal Arbitration Act. The FAA was
intended to reverse centuries ofjudicial hostility to arbitration agree-
ments and spare parties "the costliness and delays of litigation.",
3 6
Its primary purposes, however, were to place arbitration agreements
"upon the same footing as other contracts"3 7 and to "ensure judicial
enforcement of privately made agreements to arbitrate."1
38
For years there was general agreement that "the statute applied
only in the federal courts and so governed only the few contract suits
that happened to involve diversity or admiralty jurisdiction."3 9 Dur-
ing the last decade, however, the Supreme Court has radically
expanded the scope of the FAA, stating that it "creates a body of
federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor
an agreement to arbitrate.
' 40
Section 2 of the FAA makes agreements to arbitrate judicially
enforceable when the underlying contract affects interstate com-
merce, and opens such agreements to collateral attack only on "such
35 United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988)). Congress enacted title 9 of the U.S. Code with
the Act ofJuly 30, 1947, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669, entitled "Arbitration," which repealed
the name "United States Arbitration Act." See id. § 14, at 674.
36 H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924). The judiciary's
longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate has been traced to the courts
of England, which "considered irrevocable arbitration agreements as 'ousting' the
courts ofjurisdiction, and refused to enforce such agreements for this reason. This
view was adopted by American courts as part of the common law up to the time of the
adoption of the Arbitration Act." Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510
n.4 (citing H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924)).
The business community and the legal profession have long been at odds over
alternate dispute resolution. SeeJ. AUERBACHJUs CE WrrouTr LAw? 101-14 (1983).
Businessmen have tended to favor expeditious, efficient dispute resolution, while the
legal profession has trumpeted the legal shortcomings of the arbitration process. See
id. It has been suggested that once lawyers recognized that their dominant control of
dispute resolution was not threatened by the arbitration process, compromise
between the two groups became possible, and in the 1920s the result of such
compromise was the creation of the American Arbitration Association. See id. at 110-
11.
37 H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
38 Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985). The Court in
Byrd emphasized that expediting dispute resolution was a secondary concern of the
FAA, which "requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate, even if the
result is 'piecemeal' litigation .... " Id. at 221.
39 Hirshman, supra note 29, at 1305.
40 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25
n.32 (1983).
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grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract."'" Sections 3 and 4 require courts to stay proceedings that
concern issues within the scope of an agreement to arbitrate, and to
compel arbitration when a party improperly refuses to arbitrate.42
Section 9 provides for federal courts to enter judgments following
arbitral awards upon application by one of the parties to the agree-
ment.43 Section 10 limits judicial review of awards to arbitrations
involving fraud, corruption, partiality, misconduct, or situations
where arbitrators exceed their powers or fail to execute a final deci-
sion.44 The Supreme Court. has interpreted the review provisions of
the Act as providing forjudicial review only when an award indicates
"manifest disregard" of the relevant law.45
B. The Arbitrability of Statutory Claims
By 1953, the Court established that the scope of the FAA
extended to controversies involving federal statutory rights.46
Nonetheless, until the "Steelworkers Trilogy" decisions in 1960,47
the Court continued to view the competence of arbitration proceed-
ings with suspicion.
4 8
By 1983, however, the Court clearly established the presump-
tion of arbitrability, noting :hat the FAA "establishes that, as a mat-
ter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration."49 The Court later
41 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
42 See id. §§ 3-4.
43 See id. § 9.
44 See id. § 10(a)-(e).
45 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruled on other grounds,
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
46 See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431-f12.
47 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). The Supreme
Court asserted that Congress, in § 173(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), established a policy favoring
final adjustment of a labor dispute by the contractually agreed-upon method, i.e.
arbitration. See American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 566-67.
48 See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37 (stating that judicial review of arbitration awards
cannot reach errors in the interpretation of laws). Parties agreeing to arbitration
must be "willing to accept less certainty of legally correct adjustment." Id. at 438.
49 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24-25 (1983); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 626-27 (1985) ("[We] are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the
desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the
development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution."); cf Perry
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declared that "as with any other contract, the parties' intentions con-
trol, but those intentions are generously construed as to issues of
arbitrability." 50
With regard to substantive rights, the Court declared unequivo-
cally that: "By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only sub-
mits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
forum."'" The Court initially recognized that the only exception to
the presumption of arbitrability of statutory claims is "a counter-
vailing policy manifested in another federal statute."52
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,53 the
Court reversed a lower court decision and held that antitrust claims
are arbitrable, at least in the context of international transactions.
The Court explained:
We must assume that if Congress intended the substantive protec-
tion afforded by a given statute to include protection against waiver
of the right to a judicial forum, that intention will be deducible
from text or legislative history. Having made the bargain to arbi-
trate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has
evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for
the statutory rights at issue.
54
v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489-91 (1987) (holding that under the supremacy clause,
the FAA preempts state statutory provisions limiting the enforcement of arbitration
agreements); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-11, 16-17 (1984) (holding
that § 2 of the FAA declared a national policy equally applicable in state and federal
courts, and ordering arbitration of a cause of action under any state statute requiring
judicial resolution of such claims).
50 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626. Thus the Court noted that arbitration would most
likely be compelled when it determined that the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute
that fell within the purview of the FAA. See id. at 626-27.
51 Id. at 628. With respect to the antitrust laws, the Court stated that "so long
as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the
arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent
function." Id at 637.
52 Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985); see also
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627 (stating that "it is the congressional intention expressed in
some other statute on which the courts must rely to identify any category of claims as
to which agreements to arbitrate will be held unenforceable" (citations omitted)).
53 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
54 Id at 628 (citation omitted). The Mitsubishi Court declared its confidence in
the arbitral process to handle complicated statutory claims in accordance with the
law; the Court also expressed its satisfaction with the minimal safeguards provided by
judicial review. See id. at 632-34, 636-38. The Mitsubishi Court repudiated the
prevailing doctrine, articulated in American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J. P. Maguire &
Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968), that when a statute implicates important public
policy, a judicial forum is required, and that, therefore, rights conferred by the
antitrust laws are inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration. See id. at 827-28.
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Thus, the Court developed a two-step inquiry with respect to the
arbitrability of statutory claims: "first determining whether the par-
ties' agreement to arbitrate reached the statutory issues, and then,
upon finding that it did, considering whether legal constraints exter-
nal to the parties' agreement foreclosed the arbitration of those
claims."
55
Justice Stevens's dissent in Mitsubishi stated his belief that stan-
dard arbitration clauses re:ferring to claims arising out of or relating
to a contract should not be construed to reach statutory claims such
as those conferred by discrimination laws, which are only indirectly
related to the contract. 56 Justice Stevens concluded that:
[B]oth a fair respect for the importance of the interests that Con-
gress has identified as worthy of federal statutory protection, and a
fair appraisal of the most likely understanding of the parties who
sign agreements containing standard arbitration clauses, support a
presumption that such clauses do not apply to federal statutory
claims.
57
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Stevens noted the arbitrators'
lack of competence to apply "public law concepts" in interpreting
federal discrimination statutes.58
Justice Stevens's narrow reading of the FAA, coupled with a nar-
row interpretation of broad arbitration clauses and a more realistic
assessment of the limits of arbitral competence, would increase the
ability of discrimination claimants to have access to judicial fora.
However, in the cases that followed Mitsubishi, the Court rejected this
position.
C. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon
59
The Supreme Court's most forceful ruling in favor of arbitration
came in McMahon, which rendered the presumption of arbitrability
under the FAA nearly irrebuttable. In McMahon, the Court held that
The Court concluded that the public policy embodied in the antitrust laws could be
adequately protected and enforced, even if claims under those laws were brought in
arbitral rather than judicial fora. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636-37.
55 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
56 See id. at 650 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58 See id. at 647-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56-57 (1974)).
59 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
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claims arising under the antifraud provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and under RICO are subject to arbitration.60
The Court held that while the FAA's presumption of arbi-
trability "may be overridden by a contrary congressional command[,]
... [t]he burden is on the party opposing arbitration... to show that
Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the
statutory rights at issue."61 Citing Mitsubishi and Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd,6 2 the Court declared: "If Congress did intend to limit or
prohibit waiver of a judicial forum for a particular claim, such an
intent 'will be deducible from [the statute's] text or legislative his-
tory,' or from an inherent conflict between arbitration and the stat-
ute's underlying purposes. ' '63
The McMahon Court looked askance at the mistrust of arbitra-
tion it had previously expressed in Wilko v. Swan, 64 and stated that
"Wilko must be read as barring waiver of a judicial forum only where
arbitration is inadequate to protect the substantive rights at issue."
65
Recalling its holding in Mitsubishi, the Court reaffirmed its confi-
dence in the competence of arbitration and its satisfaction that judi-
cial review of arbitral awards, although minimal, was sufficient to
ensure that arbitrators would comply with the requirements of the
law.66 The Court also concluded that "the streamlined procedures
60 See id. at 238, 242.
61 Id. at 226-27 (citation omitted).
62 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
63 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628) (citations
omitted).
64 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled, Rodriguez de QuiJas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
65 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 229. It is important to note that McMahon did not
overrule Wilko. Id. at 234. The Wilho Court held that arbitration agreements between
securities brokers and customers regarding actions taken under § 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982), violated § 14, the "nonwaiver"
provision of the Act, id. § 77n, which voids any prospective waiver of its substantive
protections. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435. Because of the disparity in bargaining power
between brokers and customers, the Court questioned whether these arbitration
agreements were executed voluntarily. See id. The Court also believed that because
arbitrators were untutored in the law, they would either misunderstand or
improperly apply the relevant law and further noted that, short of cases of "manifest
disregard" of the law, the FAA did not subject arbitrators' decisions to judicial review
by federal courts. See id. at 435-36.
The McMahon Court, however, found that claims under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), which contains a nearly identical
nonwaiver provision in § 29(a), id. § 78cc(a), were arbitrable, in part because the
oversight role of the SEC under § 19, id. § 78s(b)(2), (c), ensured that the substantive
provisions of the Act were adequately protected. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233-34.
66 See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 633-37). The
applicable standard of review, as noted in Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436, is whether the
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of arbitration do not entail any consequential restriction on substan-
tive rights."-67 Under these standards, the Court went on to find that
both securities and RICO arbitration passed muster.
68
The MiMahon Court noted the role the SEC plays in overseeing
and regulating arbitration procedures related to securities claims, in
order to reach its conclusion that these arbitral tribunals were com-
petent fora.69 The Court concluded that, "where... the prescribed
[arbitration] procedures are subject to [the SEC's] authority, an arbi-
tration agreement does not effect a waiver of the protections of the
Act."-
70
In a partial concurrence and dissent sharing the Wilko Court's
arbitrator has acted in "manifest disregard" of the law. According to Wilko, this
made "interpretations of law" not subject to judicial review for error. Id. at 436-37.
67 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628). It has been
pointed out that the McMahon Court, in rejecting Wilko, expressed its acceptance of a
situation in which consumer rights are determined through a system of industry-
imposed and industry-operated arbitration rather than through judicial intervention.
See Shell, supra note 17, at 419. This result is remarkable when one considers that the
securities laws in question were "products of the New Deal intended to address
perceived imbalances between an industry that had failed to protect the public's
welfare and the public itself." Id.
At least one state, Massachusetts, attempted through its securities regulations to
overrule McMahon and provide judicial fora to securities customers. See MAss. REGS.
CODE tit. 950, § 12.204(a)(2)(G)1 1)(a)-(c) (1989). The First Circuit, however, struck
down these regulations, holding that they were preempted by the FAA, and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d
1114, 1124 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, No. 89-894 (May 29, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, US file). Thirty other states, also concerned about protecting securities
customers from being coerced into entering into arbitration agreements, had
supported a Massachusetts petition for Supreme Court review of this decision. See
High CourtAsks Input on Stock Disputes, Philadelphia InquirerJan. 23, 1990, at 10C, col.
3 (noting that the Court has asked for the Justice Department's position on the
matter).
Moreover, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce recently asked the
General Accounting Office to review how the securities industry conducts arbitration.
See Labaton, Brokerage Case Goes On and On, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1990, at D2, col. I
(noting that the McMahon case remains unresolved, subject to collateral litigation,
seven years after the court of appeals decided the case).
68 See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238, 242. With respect to RICO claims under 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c), the Court followed Mitsubishi's analysis of antitrust claims to find
that there was no inherent conflict between arbitration and RICO's underlying
purposes, and that "nothing in RICO's text or legislative history otherwise
demonstrates congressional intent to make an exception to the Arbitration Act for
RICO claims." Id. at 239-42. The Court reaffirmed that arbitrators are competent to
hear such complex issues. See id. at 239. The Court also found that RICO, like the
antitrust laws, is primarily a remedial and compensatory statute, and does not require
judicial enforcement for public interest or deterrent purposes. See id. at 240-41.
69 See id. at 233.
70 Id. at 234.
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concerns about the protection of securities consumers and the com-
petence of arbitrators, Justice Blackmun accused the majority of
abandoning investors to the "predatory behavior" of securities
industry insiders and of placing unwarranted confidence in SEC
oversight of arbitration procedure.
7 '
In Rodriguez de Quijas v. ShearsonlAmerican Express, Inc.,72 the
Supreme Court followed the logic of McMahon and explicitly over-
ruled Wilko. The Court thus eliminated any ambiguity remaining in
the law due to the McMahon Court's failure to overrule Wilko. After
Rodriguez de Quijas, the presumption of arbitrability is assailable only
by clear evidence of congressional intent manifest in another statute
to preclude waiver of a judicial forum, or if the "waiver of judicial
remedies inherently conflicts with the underlying puposes of that
other statute.",73 As noted by one court, "determining statutory
claims to be nonarbitrable on the basis of some judicially recognized
public policy rather than as a matter of statutory interpretation is no
longer permissible."
7 4
Professor Shell has suggested that "the Court has transformed
the FAA from a procedural statute that applied only in certain fed-
eral cases into a national charter for alternative dispute resolu-
tion." 75 Shell also contends that the Court's reasoning in McMahon
"suggests that virtually all existing federal statutory claims that arise
in commercial contexts are subject to arbitration," and that, as a
result, there will be "increas[ing] pressure[] on arbitrators to decide
cases with reference to public law as well as private interest. '' 6 Not-
ing the "fundamental tension, perhaps even a contradiction, in plac-
ing public law claims in the hands of a private system of dispute
resolution," Shell predicts that arbitration procedure will become
increasingly formalized, that existing doctrines ofjudicial review will
be elaborated, and that statutes will be passed which place a "greater
emphasis on the role of law in arbitral decisionmaking."7 7 Addition-
71 See id. at 243, 257 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72 109 S. Ct. 1917, 1922 (1989).
73 id at 1921 (citations omitted). Professor Shell has noted that, in overruling
Wilko, "the Rodriguez Court dropped any pretense of interpreting congressional will
on the subject and relied explicitly on its own new-found confidence in securities
arbitration procedures as an adequate substitute for judicial proceedings." Shell,
supra note 22, at 556 n.358.
74 Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 1197, 1202
(3d Cir. 1986) vacated, 482 U.S. 923 (1987).
75 Shell, supra note 17, at 397.
76 Id at 398.
77 Id. at 399. In fact, in the context of certain self-regulatory organizations, the
SEC has approved rules that require brokers to inform securities customers of their
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ally, he suggests that "Congress will have to be much more explicit
in the future if it wishes to exempt statutory claims from the reach of
the FAA."
7 8
Culminating with McMahon and Rodriguez de Quijas, the Supreme
Court has definitively interpreted the FAA to prohibit courts from
questioning the competence of arbitral tribunals to handle complex
statutory commercial disputes. 79 These include disputes between
industry professionals, as well as between industry professionals and
outsiders such as consumers, arising from the securities laws, anti-
trust laws, and RICO. Essentially the Court has read the FAA to
place congressional imprimatur upon the arbitration system, which is
a system of private dispute resolution 80 now deemed competent to
resolve disputes based upon federal statutory rights.81 Moreover, by
proscribing any challenges to the competence of arbitration, the
Court has made it impossible to find an implicit override of the FAA
in another statute based upon an assertion that arbitration would
compromise the substantive rights conferred by that statute.
II. THE ARBITRABILITY OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
This section examines whether the logic of Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon8 2 and the presumption of arbitrability
extend to the resolution of statutory claims of employment discrimi-
nation, particularly to claims of age discrimination. Prior to McMa-
hon, the Court held that arbitration pursuant to collective bargaining
agreements was inadequate to resolve and protect the statutory
rights of individuals with respect to claims of employment discrimi-
rights under mandatory arbitration agreements. See 54 Fed. Reg. 21,144, 21,153-54
(1989).
78 Id. at 415 (noting that Congress "may not signal that a particular statute is
unsuitable for arbitration by merely including general nonwaiver language").
79 See Rodriguez de Quyjas, 109 S. Ct. at 1921; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 239.
80 It has been noted that "[a]midst the current enthusiasm for arbitration, it is
easy to forget that arbitration is, at bottom, a consensual and not a public
institution." Shell, ResJudicata art Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration, 35
UCLA L. REv. 623, 674 (1988).
81 It is interesting to note in this regard that both the Court and Congress seem
to have arrived at the conclusion of arbitral competence without factfinding on the
question. See, e.g., Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 426
n.2 (1988) ("Extensive lobbying efforts secured the passage of [the FAA].); id. at 432
("[E]fforts to determine how effectively arbitration works.., have been hampered by
the relative lack of meaningful empirical data. There are few pertinent studies ...
regarding the degree to which arbitration fulfills its declared goals." (citations
omitted)).
82 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
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nation. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.," 3 the seminal case in this
area, the Court suggested that employment discrimination claims
generally were inappropriate for arbitral resolution. The Court's
decision in Alexander, to the extent that it remains vital in the wake of
McMahon (which did not even cite to Alexander), should lend strong
support to the Third Circuit's ruling in Nicholson v. CPC International
Inc.
8 4
A. Collective Bargaining Agreements Versus Individual Employment
Contracts
1. Collective Bargaining: Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
In Alexander, the Court held that an employee's statutory right to
a trial de novo under Title VII is not foreclosed by prior submission of
her claim to arbitration in the context of a collective bargaining
agreement.8 5 The Court noted the importance of the private right of
action in the enforcement of Title VII, stating that "the private liti-
gant not only redresses his own injury but also vindicates the impor-
tant congressional policy against discriminatory employment
practices." 8' 6 Although recognizing the central function of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in enforcing the
statute through informal procedures, the Court concluded that "final
responsibility for enforcement of Title VII is vested with federal
83 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
84 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989). In this case, the Court held that bringing an
ADEA claim in a judicial forum is not precluded by an arbitration clause, even in the
case of an arbitration agreement executed outside of the realm of collective
bargaining. See id. at 222.
85 See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59-60. For articulations of this conclusion in the
context of other statutes, see McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292
(1984) ("[I]n a § 1983 action, a federal court should not afford res judicata or
collateral-estoppel effect to an award in an arbitration proceeding brought pursuant
to the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement."); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981) (holding that petitioners' Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982), suit was not barred by prior
submission of their grievance to collective bargaining dispute procedures), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985); Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 850 (3d
Cir.) (holding that Congress did not intend that plaintiff raising discrimination claim
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1140 (1982), had to exhaust arbitral remedies before bringing suit), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 979 (1987).
86 Alexander, 415 U.S. at 45 (citations omitted). Professor Shell has noted that
"[t]he adjudication of a Title VII claim is both an opportunity to reverse an instance
of discrimination and an occasion for examining the institutions that made
discrimination possible." Shell, supra note 22, at 568.
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courts." 7 The Court examined the legislative history of Title VII
and held that Congress intended that the private right of action
would remain vested in the individual irrespective of a collective
agreement to arbitrate disputes.88
In Alexander, the Court acknowledged that an individual may
waive a Title VII cause .of action "as part of a voluntary settle-
ment," 9 but made clear that "there can be no prospective waiver of
an employee's rights under Title VI."9  The Court distinguished
contractual rights from statutory rights,9 and pointed out that the
arbitrator may only consider the former.9 2 The Court ruled that
arbitration was per se inadequate to vindicate Title VII rights for two
reasons. First, an arbitrator must effectuate the parties' intent rather
than the purposes of the statute.9" Second, "the resolution of statu-
tory or constitutional issues is a primary responsibility of courts, and
judicial construction has proved especially necessary with respect to
Title VII, whose broad language frequently can be given meaning
only by reference to public law concepts."94 The Court reasoned
87 Alexander, 415 U.S. at 44,; see also id. at 60 n.21 ("Courts should ever be
mindful that Congress, in enacting Title VII, thought it necessary to provide a
judicial forum for the ultimate resolution of discriminatory employment claims. It is
the duty of courts to assure the fill availability of this forum.").
88 See id. at 48-49.
89 Id. at 52. For a discussion of the issue of waivers of ADEA claims, see infra
note 120.
90 Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51.
91 See id. at 52.
92 See id. at 53-54. The "Steelworkers Trilogy" Court, establishing a precedent
of deference to arbitral decisions, stated that an arbitrator may "look for guidance
from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement." United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
93 See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56-57; see also McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466
U.S. 284, 290 (1984) ("[A]lthough arbitration is well suited to resolving contractual
disputes ... it cannot provide an adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding in
protecting the federal statutory and constitutional rights that § 1983 is designed to
safeguard."); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 744 (1981)
("Because the arbitrator is required to effectuate the intent of the parties, rather than
to enforce the statute, he may issue a ruling that is inimical to the public policies
underlying the FLSA, thus depriving an employee of protected statutory rights."),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985).
94 Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57. See also McDonald, 466 U.S. at 289 (stating that
Congress intended that Title VII, the FLSA, and § 1983 "be judicially enforceable
and that arbitration could not provide an adequate substitute forjudicial proceedings
in adjudicating claims under those statutes" (citations omitted)). The McDonald
Court also noted that an arbitrator may not have either the authority or the expertise
required to enforce and resolve complicated § 1983 questions. See id. at 290. In
Barrentine, the Court stated: "These [FLSA] statutory questions must be resolved in
light of volumes of legislative history and over four decades of legal interpretation
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that the distinguishing informality of arbitration renders it an infer-
ior forum for the resolution of Title VII claims.
9 5
It is noteworthy that the Alexander Court reached its conclusions
without relying upon the fact that the arbitration in question was
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. In fact, Justice Pow-
ell, who wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court, relegated to a
footnote the concern that arbitration in the collective bargaining
context may not protect the rights of individual employees, whose
interests in the process "may be subordinated to the collective inter-
ests of all employees in the bargaining unit."
9 6
Once the collective bargaining variable is removed from the
equation, Alexander forcefully suggests that the displacement of the
judicial forum by arbitration for discrimination claims is inappropri-
ate. Although the Third Circuit seemed persuaded by this analysis in
Nicholson, the Supreme Court did not even mention Alexander in
McMahon. It therefore remains an open question whether the Court
will follow Alexander and distinguish discrimination claims from com-
mercial claims in assessing the former's arbitrability.
In Alexander, the Court largely based its decision on an analysis
of congressional intent and on the incompatiblilty between arbitra-
tion and the underlying purposes of Title VII, thereby satisfying the
criteria later set out in McMahon for finding an implicit congressional
override of the FAA. However, the Alexander decision also contains
language questioning the competence of arbitration to resolve Title
VII discrimination claims adequately. McMahon proscribed reliance
and administrative rulings. Although an arbitrator may be competent to resolve
many preliminary factual questions ... he may lack the competence to decide the
ultimate legal issue ...... Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 743. Both the Barrentine and
Alexander courts noted that many arbitrators are not even lawyers. See id. at 743 n.21;
Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57 n.18.
95 See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 58.
96 Id. at 58 n.19 (citations omitted). In contrast, the Court in Barrentine placed
greater emphasis than it did in Alexander upon the limitations inherent in a union's
vindication of an individual employee's statutory rights through arbitration in the
context of collective bargaining. See Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 742 (discussing the point
in the main text of the opinion).
It has been noted that unionized employees tend to bring age discrimination
claims to the grievance and arbitration process often out of economic necessity,
concern about the length of litigation procedures, and out of a lack of knowledge
about how to prepare their case. See Wrong, Arbitrators'Awards in Cases Involving Age
Discrimination, 1988 LAB. LJ. 411, 417. However, it is frequently "an unsatisfactory
process for the grievant." Id. at 416. Unions prefer to "frame ... grievance[s] in
narrow contractual terms rather than venture into the broad area of age
discrimination." Id. "As a result, employees often do not feel as though their
grievances are fully represented. See id.
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upon such judicial analysis, unless, of course, it could be imputed to
Congress.
The public law concepts the Court identified in Alexander to sup-
port its holding that a judicial forum for Title VII claims is not sub-
ject to displacement logically apply to all discrimination statutes.
These considerations provide a rationale for distinguishing discrimi-
nation cases from commercial cases, and they are not dependent
upon judicial mistrust of arbitral competence. Alexander therefore
suggests that the presumption of arbitrability should not be applied
to the discrimination statutes.
2. Individual Employment Contracts with Arbitration Clauses
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question whether
discrimination statutes, suca as the ADEA, should be interpreted to
preclude compelled arbitration of the claims of employees covered
by individual employment contracts that contain broad arbitration
clauses.
97
Congress may have intended to preclude prospective waivers of
age discrimination claims through arbitration clauses out of a "pater-
nalistic" concern that parties making such agreements lack either
sufficient bargaining power or information to be held to their bar-
gains.9" Alternatively, Congress may have concluded that "the pri-
vate arbitration system is not equipped to take into account the
public or social interests inherent in certain kinds of statutory dis-
97 Judge Harry T. Edwards, CircuitJudge of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, has suggested that alternate dispute resolution
procedures, such as arbitration, are appropriate fora when clearly defined rules of
law are to be applied, as opposed to situations in which public law is to be articulated.
See Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema, 99 HAxv. L. REV. 668,
680 (1986). Thus, Edwards has suggested that some "highly fact-bound"
employment discrimination cases, which "can be resolved by applying established
principles of law," might be appropriate for alternate dispute resolution. See id. In
non-collective bargaining situations, he noted that "the experience and standards
developed through decades of labor arbitration and mediation could prove
particularly useful in settling disputes between nonunionized employees and their
employers in cases of 'unjust dismissal.' " Id. at 681 (citations omitted).
98 See Shell, supra note 80, at 671 & n.218; Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to
Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 481, 486-87
(1981) (suggesting that agreements to arbitrate should not be enforced when they
are "the product of unequal bargaining power, or of unequal transaction costs that
make it likely that one party will draft an agreement that the other will sign without
first questioning or reviewing the agreement's arbitration clause"). Sterk notes that
-[n]o one should be deprived of access to the courts unless that party has
satisfactorily demonstrated a willingness to give up such access." Id. at 518.
THE ARBITRABILITY OF ADEA CLAIMS
putes [such as age discrimination claims] and might therefore
require judicial resolution of claims for reasons of public policy."
99
It is equally plausible to conclude that, as with the RICO statute,
Congress did not intend to prevent enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate ADEA claims; that there is no conflict between arbitration
and the purposes underlying the ADEA; and that nothing in the text
or legislative history of the ADEA demonstrates congressional intent
to make an exception to the FAA for ADEA claims.
00
99 Shell, supra note 80, at 671. Sterk suggests: "Public policy should be invoked
to prevent arbitration when at issue is a legislative expression or a basic case law
principle designed for some purpose other than to foster justice between the parties
to the dispute." Sterk, supra note 98, at 483 (footnote omitted). In contrast, Sterk
would order arbitration "when the legal principles involved in a particular dispute
are designed primarily to promote justice between the parties." Id.
Professor Owen M. Fiss has argued that adjudication serves various purposes
that settlements generally cannot fulfill. See Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073,
1085 (1984). He has stated that the purpose of adjudication "is not to maximize the
ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and give force
to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes:
to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with them." Id
These propositions are often premised upon the notion that arbitrators are
"unbound generally by legal or equitable principles save their own sense ofjustice
and fairness." Stipanowich, supra note 81, at 434; see also Brunet, Questioning the
Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REv. 1, 54 (1987) ("The ADR process
may give short shrift to substantive law.... The 'procedural' emphasis of ADR tends
to undervalue the role of substantive law."). It has been argued that, "by de-
emphasizing law, ADR dilutes special protection legislatively enacted to benefit
disadvantaged groups vis a vis a particular industry or economic class." Shell, supra
note 17, at 422 (footnote omitted).
Judge Edwards has articulated similar concerns most forcefully:
I have always felt that equal employment opportunity is a fundamental
right, and that the enforcement of this right should be achieved in full
view of the public, in a public forum such as a court of law. The adjudicated
results in employment discrimination cases must be complete and
consistent. That is not to say that we should not encourage settlement of
employment discrimination claims; rather, it is merely to say that the
results in litigated cases should be based on the law and not on an
arbitrator's notion of what is fair.
Edwards, Arbitration as an Alternative in Equal Employment Disputes, ARB. J., December
1978, at 22, 24. More recently, Edwards has stated that ADR might "become[] a tool
for diminishing the judicial development of legal rights for the disadvantaged."
Edwards, supra note 97, at 679. Additionally, he has suggested that "decisionmakers
may not understand the values at stake," and that "by diverting particular types of
cases away from adjudication, we may stifle the development of law in certain disfa-
vored areas of law." Id. Characterizing ADR as permeated with "nonlegal values,"
Edwards has concluded that ADR is inappropriate for the resolution of constitutional
or public law issues. See id. at 682-83.
100 For expression of this idea in the RICO context, see McMahon, 482 U.S. at
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]3. The ADEA
There is no explicit override of the FAA in the ADEA. This sec-
tion examines the purposes underlying the ADEA, its text and legis-
lative history, in order to assess whether the statute provides an
implicit override of the FAA.
1. The Purpose and Effects of the ADEA
The ADEA arose out of a study, mandated by the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and conducted by the Secretary of Labor, which found
widespread age discrimination based upon employers' erroneous
assumptions about the productivity and abilities of older workers. 
10 1
Thus, the ADEA was passed in 1967 "to promote employment of
older persons 0" based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and
workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of
101 See McKenry, Enforcement of Age Discrimination in Employment Legislation, 32
HASTINGS LJ. 1157, 1158 (1981); Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 90 HARV. L. REV. 380, 383 (1976) [hereinafter Age Discrimination]. This finding
has been used by a number of courts and commentators to draw a distinction
between age discrimination and other forms of discrimination, such as discrimination
based upon race or sex, that occur in the context of employment. See, e.g.,
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (finding,
inter alia, that age did not constitute a suspect class requiring strict scrutiny for equal
protection purposes); Age Discrimination, supra, at 383-84 (drawing the distinction that
"age [as opposed to race or creed] is at some point inherently related to ability, a fact
which is implicitly recognized by both the legislative history and the provisions of the
ADEA" (emphasis in original)). Additionally, it may be significant that Congress
chose, after debate, to exclude age discrimination from the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575. 578 (1978); McKenry, supra, at 1158.
Both the ADEA and its legislative history indicate that there was strong support
in Congress for the proposition that age discrimination might be eliminated if
misconceptions about the abilities of older workers were dispelled. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 622(a) (1985) (mandating research and education programs to inform employers,
unions, and the general public about "the needs and abilities of older workers, and
their potentials for continued employment and contribution to the economy"); 113
CONG. REC. 31,253 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Yarborough) (noting the utmost
importance of educating employers that "older workers are at least as productive as
younger workers"). However, it has been noted that "changing attitudes about aging
may be particularly difficult to accomplish, since age discrimination is often viewed as
a benign accommodation of a natural process, without the invidious intent commonly
acknowledged as characteristic of race and sex discrimination." Schuster and Miller,
An Empirical Assessment of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 64, 65-66 (1984) (footnote omitted).
102 "Older persons" are defined as "individuals who are at least 40 years of
age." 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1988). As originally enacted, the ADEA covered only to
age sixty-five. In 1978, the Act was amended to reach age seventy, and in 1986 this
limitation of age seventy was eliminated. See id. § 631(a) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
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age on employment."' 1 3 The Act forbids age discrimination in hir-
ing, promotion, terms of employment, and discharge.'
0 4
Increasingly large numbers of age discrimination suits have
been instituted pursuant to the ADEA,'0 5 relating primarily to dis-
charge and involuntary retirement.106 This litigation serves both
educational and enforcement functions.' 0 7 Although upper echelon
employees are perhaps the most visible victims of age discrimination,
a recent congressional report asserted that "[a]ge discrimination vic-
tims typically earn more than the minimum wage, but their average
annual income is only $15,000. ''1o8 The number of workers covered
by the ADEA is increasing as the baby boom generation reaches mid-
dle age, and once older workers are out of work, they are signifi-
cantly handicapped in their ability to find new employment.' 09
103 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982). A more complete statement of congressional
findings behind the creation of the ADEA is as follows:
The Congress hereby finds and declares that (1) in the face of rising
productivity and affluence, older workers find themselves disadvantaged
in their efforts to retain employment, and especially to regain employment
when displaced from jobs; (2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless
of potential for job performance has become a common practice, and
certain otherwise desirable practices may work to the disadvantage of
older persons; (3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term
unemployment with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and employer
acceptability is, relative to the younger ages, high among older workers;
their numbers are great and growing; and their employment problems
grave; (4) the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary
discrimination in employment because of age, burdens commerce and the
free flow of goods in commerce.
Id § 621(a).
104 See id §§ 623(a)-(c) (forbidding age discrimination practices by employers,
employment agencies, and labor organizations). The provisions of the ADEA specify
five exemptions from the Act's prohibitions. Practices that would ordinarily be
prohibited are permissible where (a) age is a bona fide occupational qualification; (b)
the differentiation is based on reasonable factors besides age; (c) the employee is
working in a foreign country and compliance would violate the laws of this foreign
country; (d) the employer is observing the terms of a bona fide seniority system or
benefit plan which is not a subterfuge to evade the ADEA; or (e) the employer is
discharging or disciplining an employee for good cause. See id. § 623(o.
105 See Age Bias Claims Mount as Demographic, Legal, Economic Pressures Increase,
[Analysis] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 53, at C-1 (March 19, 1985); Schuster and
Miller, supra note 101, at 65 & n.14 (citing Note, EEOC Reports Increase in Age
Discrimination Complaints, 4 AGING & WORK 281-82 (1981)).
106 See Schuster and Miller, supra note 101, at 74.
107 See id. at 66.
108 H.R. REP. No. 221, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 9-10 (1989).
109 See id. at 10 (noting that "once out of work, these older Americans have less
than a 50/50 chance of ever finding new employment. They often have little or no
savings, and may not yet be eligible for Social Security benefits").
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2. The ADEA's Relationship to Title VII, the FLSA, and the
EEOC
The ADEA borrows much of its substantive language forbidding
employment discrimination from Title VII."10 Its enforcement pro-
visions are largely derived from the FLSA."' Congress initially
vested enforcement of the Act in the Secretary of Labor, who, along
with private individuals, was granted the right to bring actions in
court for legal and equitable relief." 2 In 1978, Congress transferred
responsibility for enforcement from the Secretary of Labor to the
EEOC, 1"3 the agency charged with enforcing the provisions of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with respect to employment dis-
crimination based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
114
Commentators and courts have disagreed strongly over whether
110 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1)-(2) (1982) (describing the employer practices
that are unlawful if undertaken because of an individual's age) with 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2) (1982) (describing the employer practices that are unlawful if
undertaken because of an individual's "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin").
"'1 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 626(a)-(e) (1982) (enforcement provisions of the
ADEA) with id. §§ 201-219 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (enforcement provisions of the
FLSA). Both statutes allow suits to be brought either by the Secretary of Labor or a
private individual. Section 626(b) provides that specified rights created by the ADEA
are to be "enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures
provided in" particular sections of the FLSA. See id. § 626(b)-(c) (1982); id. § 216
(1982 & Supp. V 1987).
Departing from the FLSA, however, the ADEA requires an individual to allow
the Secretary to attempt to eliminate the unlawful practice through informal methods
before the individual may bring suit. Compare id. § 626(d) (1982) with id. § 216(b)
(1982 & Supp. V 1987). Moreover, if the Secretary brings suit on behalf of an
aggrieved individual, her right to sue terminates. Compare id. § 626(c) (1982) with id.
§ 216(b) (providing that right to sue terminates only in limited circumstances).
112 See id. § 626(b)-(c) (1976).
113 See Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 321, § 2 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
app. at 1366 (1988), and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978).
114 The EEOC was created by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-4 to -5 (1982), in order to assure "equality of employment
opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, at 44 (1974).
In 1979, the EEOC took the position that the ADEA was to be interpreted "in a
manner which is consistent with Title VII .... ." 44 Fed. Reg. 68,858 (1979).
However, as noted supra note 101, age discrimination and the discrimination
prohibited under Title VII differ significantly, and although the EEOC's position
clearly influences enforcement practices under the ADEA, courts and commentators
have not consistently accepted this position. See, e.g., McKenry, supra note 101, at
1168, 1183 ("[Because] [flundamental differences exist between the groups harmed
by age discrimination and the groups protected under Title VII... an effort towards
uniformity in interpretation [of the ADEA] consistent with principles developed
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FLSA or Tide VII precedent should govern interpretation of the
ADEA, particularly with respect to waivers of rights under the Act. 1
5
A discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Comment,
which will argue that all of the discrimination statutes should be
interpreted consistently, in order to preserve access to judicial fora
for their beneficiaries.
3. The Remedial and Enforcement Provisions of the Act
To provide remedies for age discrimination claims, the ADEA
provides that:
In any action brought to enforce this chapter the court shall have
jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appro-
priate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including without
limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or
promotion, or enforcing the liability for amounts deemed to be
unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under
this section 16
under Title VII may not result in the most effective, equitable, or purposeful
enforcement of the ADEA."). Similarly:
While the language of the ADEA may be identical to that of Title VII in
most respects, the problems of age, race and sex discrimination are not.
As a result, in resolving these questions under the ADEA, courts would do
well to avoid automatic application of Title VII precedents and to look
instead more carefully to the distinctive aspects of age discrimination.
Age Discrimination, supra note 101, at 411. Some courts have more readily accepted
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defenses in ADEA cases than in Tide
VII cases, where BFOQ defenses tend to be more strictly and narrowly construed.
See McKenry, supra note 101, at 1174-75.
115 See Note, Waiver of Rights Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 1067, 1067 (1986) (arguing that waivers are a desirable "legal
device for disposing of age discrimination disputes"); see also infra note 120. Before
Congress explicitly provided for a right to jury trials in ADEA cases in 1978, the
Supreme Court held that jury trials were available as a matter of right in ADEA cases,
basing this conclusion primarily upon the inclusion of FLSA provisions in the ADEA.
See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-85 (1978).
116 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). This section also provides for liquidated
damages in cases of willful violations of the law. The Act further provides for
criminal penalties for interference with EEOC activities with respect to claims arising
under the Act. See id. § 629. Although it is beyond the scope of this Comment, there
is a division of authority as to whether compensatory damages for pain and suffering
are available under the ADEA. See Drucker and Parker, A Review of the Procedural
Requirements of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, in AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT: A SYMPosIuM HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND PERSONNEL
PRACTIIONERS 68, 87-88 (1983).
An award of attorneys' fees is available to a prevailing plaintiff under the ADEA.
See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982) (incorporating 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982) (FLSA) and
providing for "a reasonable attorney's fee"). Congress, by providing such awards,
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Before an ADEA action is instituted in court, however, the Act
requires that the EEOC "shall attempt to eliminate the discrimina-
tory practice or practices alleged, and to effect voluntary compliance
with the requirements of this chapter through informal methods of
conciliation, conference, and persuasion."
1 7
Although the ADEA grants any person the right to bring a civil
action, that right is extinguished upon the commencement of a civil
action on that person's behalf by the EEOC." 8 An individual wish-
ing to institute a civil action under the ADEA must first file a
"charge" with the EEOC and allow EEOC administrative procedures
to run for sixty days, during which time the EEOC is required to
attempt to address the problem through informal methods." 9 In
encourages private litigants to bring ADEA actions since it becomes easier to obtain
legal representation. See, e.g., Cooper v. Singer, 719 F.2d 1496, 1502 (10th Cir.
1983) (stating that "[i]n providing incentives for meritorious civil rights litigation,
section 1988 [the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)]
strikes a delicate balance, encouraging civil rights litigation where success can be
achieved through a reasonable expenditure of legal services").
Arbitration rules, such as those promulgated by the American Arbitration
Association, do not generally provide for attorneys' fees. See AM. ARB. Ass'N COMM.
ARB. R. Barring a stipulation in an arbitration agreement providing for the provision
of attorneys' fees, it would be within the discretion of an arbitrator deciding an age
discrimination claim, just as it is within the discretion of a court in an ADEA case, to
award such fees to a prevailing party. The chances of receiving such an award would
seem greater in a judicial forum; an arbitrator is not bound by the statute, and she
generally operates with a wider range of discretion and is subject to less stringent
standards of review than courts. Moreover, arbitration generates a greater likelihood
of compromise resolutions. Of course, it would be within the discretion of an
arbitrator to decide that the parties did not contemplate in their agreement the award
of attorney's fees.
Preclusion of access to a judicial forum may conflict with the purpose of the
ADEA to the extent that the award of attorney's fees provides an incentive for
employees to bring age discrimination claims in courts, thereby furthering the
enforcement of the statute and contributing to the elimination of age discrimination.
It should also be noted that many ADEA claims are brought by parties with
private contingent fee arrangements, and such arrangements have been recognized
by the courts in granting "reasonable" fee awards, as mandated by the ADEA. See
Cooper, 719 F.2d at 1503. The compensability of contingency fee arrangements also
encourages bringing ADEA claims.
117 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
118 See id. § 626(c)(1).
119 See id. § 626(d). As an administrative factfinder, the EEOC acts in a public,
'judicial capacity," and serves essentially as a surrogate for the court. Cf University
of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 797 (1986) (stating "it is sound policy to apply
principles of issue preclusion to the factfinding of administrative bodies acting in a
judicial capacity"). The Alexander Court, however, stated that Congress created the
EEOC as a means to promote employers' voluntary compliance with Title VII, but
that ultimate authority to enforce Title VII rights is vested in the federal courts. See
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 44. In reviewing state age
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1978, the ADEA was amended to provide, inter alia, that an individ-
ual claimant "shall be entitled to a trial by jury of any issue of fact in
any such action for recovery of amounts owing as a result of a viola-
tion of this chapter, regardless of whether equitable relief is sought
by any party in such action."'
20
Thus, the ADEA attempts to prevent and eliminate age discrimi-
nation in employment and to compensate its victims. The Act was
born out of a finding by Congress that age discrimination represents
a significant problem in our society, and there is every indication that
the scope of the problem will increase as the century draws to a
close. To effectuate congressional intent, the courts must remain
sensitive to the problem and resist efforts to undermine the protec-
tive legislation enacted to address it. As suggested in the discussion
of the Nicholson case that follows, enforcing private agreements to
arbitrate ADEA claims, particularly those arising out of broad arbi-
discrimination law prior to the passage of the ADEA, Congress found that "[w]hile
promotion, education, and persuasion are most effective, enforcement procedures
are necessary to get the required attention of employers and others." H.R. REP. No.
805, 90th Cong., 1st. Sess. 3 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 2213, 2215.
120 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1982). The issue of the retroactive waiver of rights
under the ADEA as part of settlements has caused a great deal of debate and
litigation. A bill to amend the ADEA by limiting the circumstances under which such
waivers would be permitted, entitled the Age Discrimination in Employment Waiver
Protection Act of 1989, is currently before Congress. See S. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989); H.R. 1432, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). The purpose of this amendment to
the ADEA is "to ensure that older workers are not coerced or manipulated into
waiving their rights to seek legal relief under the Act." H.R. REP. No. 221, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1989). Thus, "[t]he bill allows waivers only if an individual has
made a bona fide claim of age discrimination against an employer, by filing a charge
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), initiating a court
action, or making a specific written allegation directly to the employer." Id.
(emphasis in original). Additionally, any waiver must meet various criteria:
(1) the waiver is knowing and voluntary; (2) the waiver is part of a written
agreement that makes specific reference to rights and claims under the
ADEA; (3) the agreement does not apply to rights or claims that may arise
after the date of the agreement itself; (4) the waiver is exchanged for
valuable consideration in addition to what the individual already is
entitled to receive; (5) the individual is given a reasonable period of not
less than 14 days in which to review and consider the settlement
agreement; (6) the individual is advised orally and in writing to consult
with an attorney before executing a waiver; (7) the individual is informed
orally and in writing that he or she may be accompanied by another
individual of his or her choice during the negotiation process to settle the
ADEA claim; and (8) a notice of the settlement is filed with the EEOC.
Id.; see also S. REP. No. 79, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (substantively identical to the
House Report).
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tration clauses in employment contracts, represents a threat to fulfil-
ling the purposes of the ADEA.
III. NICHOLSON V. CPC INTERNATIONAL, INC.
In June, 1989, the Third Circuit held in Nicholson v. CPC Interna-
tional, Inc. 121 that an employee with an individual employment con-
tract containing a broad arbitration clause is not precluded by such a
clause from bringing an ADEA claim in a judicial forum. 122 The
court concluded that arbitration is inherently inconsistent with the
purposes of the ADEA. Tie reasoning of this decision supports the
proposition that statutes designed to address discrimination in
employment should be presumed implicitly to override the FAA.
A. Background
Nicholson, a corporate executive, attorney, and longstanding
employee of CPC International (CPC), signed an employment con-
tract with CPC that included an arbitration clause under which all
disputes were to be settled through arbitration. 23 After being dis-
charged, Nicholson filed art ADEA charge with the EEOC, which was
subsequently "administratively terminated at his request so that he
could file suit.'
124
Nicholson originally brought suit against CPC in state court in
New Jersey,' 25 whereupon CPC removed the action to the United
121 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989). This case was settled before the Supreme
Court acted upon CPC's petition for certiorari.
122 See id. at 230.
123 See id. at 222-23. The arbitration clause provided that:
Any dispute or controversy arising under or in connection with this
Agreement shall be settled exclusively by arbitration, conducted before a
panel of three arbitrators in New York City in accordance with the rules of
the American Arbitration Association then in effect. Judgment may be
entered on the arbitrators' award in any court having jurisdiction. The
expense of such'arbitration shall be borne by the Company.
Id. at 223.
124 Id.
125 Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Docket No. L-
97370-87. The Third Circuit briefs of the parties reveal that in the ensuing litigation,
culminating in the Third Circuit, Nicholson and CPC disputed various issues
including: the degree of voluntariness with which Nicholson entered the agreement;
whether he received valuable consideration in exchange for the agreement; whether
his position was eliminated or whether he was replaced by a younger person; and
whether Nicholson had agreed to arbitrate an ADEA claim. See Brief for Defendants-
Appellants at 6-12 and Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 1-6, Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc.,
877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989) (No. 88-5588).
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States District Court of New Jersey126 and moved to compel arbitra-
tion pursuant to the FAA. The district court refused to order arbi-
tration as to the ADEA claim, but granted CPC's motion for
interlocutory appeal to the Third Circuit.
12 7
B. The Issues
1. The Presumption of Arbitrability v. the Presumption of
Nonarbitrability
The Third Circuit majority in Nicholson began its analysis of the
arbitrability question by distinguishing Supreme Court precedent
that, on the one hand, established a presumption of arbitrability
under the FAA in the context of the Sherman Act, the securities laws,
and civil RICO, and, on the other hand, established a presumption of
nonarbitrability in the context of ERISA, the FLSA, Title VII, and
§ 1983.128 The court noted that the presumption of arbitrability
"will be defeated when it is 'overridden by a contrary congressional
command' in another statute." 12 9 The court concluded that the
recent Supreme Court opinion in Rodriguez de Quias v. Shearson/Amer-
126 See Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1019 (D.N.J.
1988), aft'd, 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989). Removal was pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441
as the case involved an ADEA claim.
127 See ia at 1023. Denying CPC's motion to compel arbitration, the district
court relied upon its prior decision in a similar case, Steck v. Smith Barney, Harris
Upham & Co., Inc., 661 F. Supp. 543 (D.N.J. 1987). In Steck, the court concluded
that Congress intended to preclude waiver ofjudicial remedies under the ADEA. See
id. at 547. Among the court's concerns was that under the ADEA courts were
granted broad equitable and legal relief powers which would not be within an
arbitrator's authority. See id- at 546-47. The Nicholson court also held that
"arbitration is insufficient for the vindication of the ADEA's goals ...." Nicholson, 46
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1022.
The court further noted, in distinguishing Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), that the EEOC's influence and control "pales in
comparison to the SEC's," and that with respect to the ADEA, in contrast to RICO,
its enforcement and deterrent functions are as central as its remedial function. See
Nicholson, 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1022-23.
Another district court disagreed with the decision in Steck, and found a similar
ADEA claim arbitrable. See Pihl v. Thomson McKinnon Securities, 48 Fair Empl.
Prac. Gas. (BNA) 922 (E.D. Pa. 1988). In this case, which was settled prior to the
Third Circuit's decision in Nicholson, the court "found nothing ... that evinces a
congressional intent to exclude ADEA claims from the dictates of the Arbitration
Act." Id. at 924.
128 See Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 224.
129 Id. (quoting Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,
226 (1987)).
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ican Express, Inc. 30 "is consistent with the line of cases enforcing arbi-
tration agreements in the setting of business transactions."
'
131
Thus, for purposes of determining arbitrability, the Nicholson
court drew a distinction between cases involving. business transac-
tions and cases involving discrimination. Noting that the labor dis-
crimination cases, particularly Barrentine and Alexander, rested upon
an analysis of the statutes involved, the court declined to discount
their precedential value because they arose in the context of collec-
tive bargaining agreements and expressed, in part, a mistrust of
arbitration.' 
32
In fact, the Nicholson court suggested that the disparity of bar-
gaining power between employers and employees generally, and
between employers and older employees particularly, discredited
the argument that arbitration provisions in individual employment
contracts were comparable to those found in arm's-length commer-
cial contracts. 33 Thus, the court stated:
The disparity in bargaining power between an employer and an
individual employee is well known. Older employees who have
invested many years of their career with a particular employer may
lack any realistic option to refuse to sign a standard form arbitra-
tion agreement presented to them by their employers. New
employees who need the job may be in a similar position.
Although this may not constitute the type of duress which renders
a contract voidable, we cannot close our eyes to the realities of the
workplace. 
134
is0 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
i1 Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 224. The dissent took issue with this proposition,
arguing that there is nothing in the FAA or in the cases interpreting it which
"evince[] an interpretation of the FAA that would limit its application to commercial
settings .... ." Id. at 233 n.3 .'Becker, J., dissenting). Additionally, the dissent
contended that an arbitration agreement between a business executive and her
employer takes place in no less of a business setting than does such an agreement
between a securities investor and a securities broker. See id. In response, the
majority opinion pointed out the danger of ruling on a matter of law based upon
particular characteristics of a party before the court. See id. at 229 & n.9. Yet
persuasive authority exists for the proposition that most ADEA claimants are not
business executives. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 221, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1989)
(noting that the average annual income of age discrimination victims is only
$15,000).
132 See Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 229. The dissent disagreed on the relevance of
these labor discrimination cases because it concluded they turned upon the existence
of collective bargaining agreements, rather than upon a finding of implied
congressional preemption of arbitrability. See id. at 235 (Becker, J., dissenting).
133 See id. at 229.
134 Id. On the other hand, the dissent stated: "Because (the ADEA's] goals can
be effectively achieved through a variety of forums and through individual bargaining
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2. The Inherent Conflict Between Arbitration and the ADEA
The Nicholson court assessed the text and legislative history of
the ADEA according to the test mandated by the Supreme Court in
Mitsubishi and McMahon in order to ascertain whether Congress
intended "to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies" for ADEA
claims, or whether there was "an inherent conflict between arbitra-
tion and the statute's underlying purposes." 135
Emphasizing the importation of provisions from the FLSA into
the Act, the court distinguished the ADEA from Title VII, noting
that "[t]he ADEA vests primary enforcement responsibility with the
[EEOC], to which the individual's right of action under the Act is
secondary." Relying upon the FLSA enforcement provisions"'
as to the proper forum, I cannot conclude that the ADEA prohibits normal market
forces to operate where parties bargain over this type of forum-selection clause." Id.
at 243 (Becker, J., dissenting) (contrasting the ADEA to civil rights statutes in which
Congress intended to foreclose forum-selection clauses in order to provide a federal
instead of a state judicial forum).
The dissent also noted that the Supreme Court had compelled arbitration of
securities disputes in McMahon with the recognition that the bargaining power
between customers and brokers was unequal, although insufficient to void the
agreement based upon standard contract principles. See id. at 243-44 (Becker, J.,
dissenting). The dissent cites Rodriguez de Quyias, 109 S. Ct. at 1920, for the notion
that the right to select a forum is waivable despite the "rationale that the Securities
Act was intended to place buyers of securities on an equal footing with sellers." Id.
(Becker, J. dissenting). The dissent suggested that the majority's discomfort with
extant disparity in bargaining power in ADEA cases was an irrelevant factor.
The majority rejected CPC's argument that Nicholson and most ADEA claimants
are upper-level employees who need no protection from the consequences of the
agreements they voluntarily and knowingly enter. See Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 229.
Instead, the court found that "many ADEA plaintiffs are not highly paid executives,"
idL at 230. In fact, the court acknowledged that Congress and the Secretary of Labor
had found that age discrimination against older, higher paid employees was a serious
problem because of incentives for employers to replace them with younger workers
and the difficulties such workers have in finding comparable alternate employment.
See id
135 Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 224 (quoting McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227 and citing
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
136 Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 224 (citations omitted). The court distinguished the
ADEA from Title VII in this regard, noting that under § 626(c)(1) of the ADEA an
individual's right to sue is extinguished if the EEOC brings suit in her behalf. See id.
at 225. Thus, "unlike under Title VII, the individual's right to seek redress against
an employer for age discrimination is subordinate under the ADEA to the
enforcement action of the public agency charged with the ADEA's administration."
Id. (citations omitted).
137 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982). The Nicholson court stated that:
These provisions, including civil liability for employer violations of the
applicable laws, a right by aggrieved employees to bring an action in any
court of competent jurisdiction, and the termination of this right upon the
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reflected in the ADEA, the court cited the Supreme Court's decision
in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. 138 for the proposition
that these FLSA rights could not be waived through an agreement to
arbitrate.13 9 The court therefore determined that Congress' incor-
poration of FLSA enforcement provisions into the ADEA reflected
"a deliberate policy choice in favor of enforcement of ADEA claims
in court proceedings.'
140
The Nicholson court also examined the 1978 amendment to the
ADEA,14 1 which tolled the statute of limitations for up to a year
pending the completion of EEOC conciliation efforts. The court
concluded that the amendment was intended to ensure access to the
courts for individuals in the case of the termination of EEOC pro-
ceedings. The court also concluded that the amendment was
intended to prevent employers from using delaying tactics during
such proceedings to postpone settlement and possibly avoid liabil-
ity.1 4 2  Thus, the court stated: "This suggests that Congress
intended that extrajudicia methods of seeking resolution of age dis-
crimination claims should not impede ultimate resolution of those
claims in a judicial fonm when extrajudicial methods proved
inadequate."'
143
filing of a complaint for 'injunction proceedings' by the agency in charge
of enforcement of the statute, are as fully applicable to ADEA actions as to
FLSA actions."
Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 225 (citation omitted).
138 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
139 See Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 225. The dissent criticized the majority's reliance
upon Barrentine, pointing out that in Coventry v. United States Steel Corp., 856 F.2d
514, 521 n.8 (3d Cir. 1988), the court had previously held that FLSA standards were
not always to be read into the ADEA. See Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 233 (Becker, J.,
dissenting). In Coventry, the court wrote, with respect to retroactive waivers of ADEA
rights, that "although we conclude that the interpretation given to the FLSA should
inform the decision regarding the proper manner to interpret the ADEA, we cannot
conclude that an absolute bar against private settlement of claims that arise under the
ADEA best effectuates the purposes of that statute." Coventry, 856 F.2d at 521-22
n.8.
140 Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 226.
141 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(2) (1985).
142 See Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 226 (citing S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
13 (1977)).
143 Id. The dissent argued that Congress merely wanted to make sure that
ADEA claims reached an "adjudicatory forum," finding nothing in the ADEA or its
legislative history to indicate that Congress intended to preclude extrajudicial
methods, such as arbitration, as "inherently inferior to judicial resolution." Id. at
236 (Becker, J., dissenting).
The court also noted that Nicholson and the EEOC as amicus curiae for Nicholson
had argued that the 1978 ADEA amendment providing for an explicit right to trial by
jury manifested congressional intent that the right to a judicial forum for ADEA
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The Nicholson court found, nonetheless, that the text and legisla-
tive history of the ADEA spoke inconclusively to the issue of arbitra-
tion. In an attempt to resolve the issue, the court continued to
follow the analysis prescribed by the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi and
McMahon and "examine[d] [the question] whether the objectives of
the ADEA are inherently incompatible with the displacement by arbi-
tration of a judicial forum for claimants alleging age discrimina-
tion."'144 For the following reasons, the court found such
incompatibility.
a. The Primacy of the Role of the EEOC
The Nicholson court addressed the primacy of the role Congress
allocated to the EEOC in the ADEA145 and concluded that
mandatory arbitration would undermine that role and thereby con-
travene congressional intent. The court speculated that charges that
would ordinarily be reported to the EEOC would probably not be
made if an employee were precluded from access to a judicial
forum. 146 Viewing the EEOC and ultimately the courts as guardians
of the public interest, the court stated:
Any procedure that detracts from the EEOC charge requirement
would undermine Congress' design, since the charge not only
informs the EEOC of the particular discrimination but also may
identify other unlawful practices.... Any process which contrib-
claims be nonwaivable. See id. at 226 n.5. Nicholson noted that the amendment was
prompted in part by the notion that juries, as opposed to judges, might be more
"open" to claims of age discrimination. Brief for Appellee at 13-14, Nicholson v.
CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989) (No. 88-5588) (quoting 123 CONG. REC.
34318 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) ("juries are more likely to
be open to the issues which have been raised by the plaintiffs")). The Nicholson court
did not rely on this proposition because the right to ajury trial is also available under
the Sherman Act, yet claims under this Act were found arbitrable in Mitsubishi. See
Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 226 n.5.
144 Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 227 (citations omitted).
145 See id. (noting "Congress' clear intent that compliance with the ADEA be
overseen by a public agency").
146 See id. (outlining the importance of the charge under Title VII and finding an
equally important role under the ADEA). The dissent believed that EEOC
involvement with an alleged violation is unaffected by an arbitration agreement,
which only would affect an individual's choice of forum. See id. at 238-39 (Becker, J.,
dissenting). The dissent remarked that an aggrieved party cannot be precluded from
filing a charge with the EEOC, which preserves the avenue to the EEOC even with a
signed arbitration agreement. Additionally, the dissent disputed the majority's
contention that employees compelled to arbitrate their ADEA claims and barred
from judicial fora, will be unlikely to file charges with the EEOC. Judge Becker
reasoned that such disgruntled employees, wary of arbitration, actually would have
an incentive to file EEOC charges. See id. at 238 (Becker, J., dissenting).
1990] 1847
1848 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 138:1817
utes to employers' avoidance of the scrutiny to which an EEOC
charge investigation would subject them is necessarily incompati-
ble with the congressional scheme for the ADEA.
14 7
b. The Lack of EEOC Oversight of Arbitration
The court noted that the McMahon decision relied upon the
SEC's power to ensure the adequacy of arbitration procedures in
securities cases to express confidence that arbitration was competent
to vindicate the statutory rights at issue in those cases.1 48 By con-
trast, the Nicholson opinion pointed out that "no statutory provision
gives the EEOC the power to affect the arbitration procedure" in
ADEA cases.
14 9
147 Id. at 227-28. The Nicholson court rejected the argument that a statute that
prescribes "informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion," must
countenance arbitration, which is such an informal method of resolving disputes. Id.
at 228. The court stated:
Congress' intent, as explicitly stated in the text of the statute, is not only
that disputes concerning claims of age discrimination be resolved through
informal means, but that t11 EEOC 'eliminate the discriminatory practice or
practices alleged' by encouraging voluntary compliance if possible. It is
only through the conciliation process that the EEOC has its opportunity
to secure voluntary compliance."
Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1985)). The EEOC, which intervened as amicus
curiae in support of Nicholson, argued that arbitration threatened to diminish the
"policing function" of the EEOC in the enforcement of the ADEA. Brief for the
EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Plaintiff-Appellee at 7, Nicholson v. CPC
Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989) (No. 88-5588) (emphasis in original). CPC
argued, however, that "[w]aiver of the judicial forum is not a waiver of a substantive
right and Congressional concern to preserve the latter cannot be equated with a
determination to preserve the former." Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 23-24,
Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989) (No. 88-5588). CPC noted
that "there is also a significant public interest in securities regulation, antitrust
enforcement and the elimination of racketeering, and there is no basis for drawing
'public purpose' distinctions between these statutes and ADEA." Id. at 23.
The dissent in Nicholson argued that the statutory scheme "does not compel the
conclusion that Congress intended that the EEOC must be involved in every instance
of age discrimination in this country." Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 237 (Becker,J., dissent-
ing). The dissent seemed persuaded by language in the legislative history of the
ADEA that reflected a desire for expedited, informal resolutions of ADEA claims. See
id. (citing, inter alia, Age Discrimination in Employment- Hearings on S. 830 and S. 786 Before
the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25
(1967) (remarks of Sen. Javits) (noting EEOC backlogs and the hardship of such
delays upon older citizens)).
148 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
149 Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 228; see also id. at 228 n.6. The dissent stressed that the
oversight role of an administrative agency cannot be dispositive of whether the FAA
will be enforced, noting that in antitrust and RICO cases, arbitration was found
acceptable in the absence of any administrative agency involvement. See id. at 239
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c. The Inability of Arbitrators to Award Equitable Remedies
The Third Circuit considered the limited remedies available in
arbitration as indicative of its inability to enforce the ADEA effec-
tively and eliminate age discrimination.15 This view was based upon
the court's conclusion that arbitrators are limited in their ability to
award to a plaintiff or a class of plaintiffs the broad equitable relief
available under the ADEA."' The court cited the rules of the Amer-
ican Arbitration Association limiting arbitral remedies to "the scope
of the agreement of the parties" to support the proposition that an
arbitrator, as opposed to a court, is prevented from issuing injunc-
tive relief that would bar future acts of employer discrimination, as
well as discrimination against other employees not before the
arbitrator. 152
(Becker, J., dissenting) (referring to Mitsubishi and McMahon). The dissent concluded
that the McMahon decision had merely taken notice of the expanded power of the
SEC to govern self-regulating organizations. On the other hand, the majority
asserted that the McMahon Court's explicit reliance on SEC oversight authority was
used to support its conclusion that arbitration would not effect a waiver of the
substantive rights protected by the statute in question. See id. at 228 n.6. Although
the language in McMahon regarding this issue is ambiguous, the Supreme Court in
McMahon did "conclude that where, as in this case, the prescribed procedures are
subject to the Commission's § 19 authority, an arbitration agreement does not effect
a waiver of the protections of the Act." McMahon, 482 U.S. at 234.
The Nicholson dissent also noted that since there was no explicit preclusion of
arbitration in the ADEA, the EEOC, which was granted rulemaking power, might
"infer" that Congress had delegated to it the power to regulate arbitration in ADEA
cases, and that potentially the EEOC might have equal or even greater power than
the SEC to control arbitration within its sphere. See Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 240. The
majority, however, was persuaded that the securities cases were distinguishable
because the nexus between the rulemaking authority of the administrative agency
and the statute, recognized and relied upon by the Court in McMahon to justify its
confidence in the arbitral process, is more direct and well-established in the securities
laws than with respect to the ADEA. See id. at 228 n.6.
150 See Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 228-29.
151 See id (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1985); id. § 216(b) (1982)).
152 See id. at 228 & n.7 (quoting AM. ARB. Ass'N COMM. ARB. R. 17). The
dissent, in contrast, believed that arbitrators are empowered to grant as broad a
range of equitable relief as courts, particularly with regard to broad arbitration
agreements or so-called "unrestricted submissions," and that arbitration is therefore
capable of achieving the objective of the ADEA, namely to eliminate age
discrmination in employment. See id at 240 (Becker, J., dissenting). 'The dissent
noted that the rules of the American Arbitration Association state that: "The
arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and equitable
and within the scope of the agreement of the parties .... " Id. (quoting AM. ARB.
AsS'N COMM. ARB. R 43, Scope of Award (emphasis supplied by the dissent)).
Furthermore, the dissent pointed out that:
In 1978, partly in response to the concerns expressed in Alexander, with
respect to the adequacy of the arbitral forum for determination of
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3. Support Among the Sister Circuits
The Third Circuit cit.ed cases from other federal courts of
appeal in support of its position that an arbitration clause should not
preclude an ADEA claimant from access to a judicial forum. In Cris-
well v. Western Airlines, Inc., "' pilots covered by a collective bargain-
ing agreement brought an ADEA action against an airline
challenging the airline's policy that prevented pilots nearing
mandatory retirement age from "downbidding" to positions that
would allow them to continue working past the mandatory retire-
ment age for pilots.' An arbitration board had heard the grievance
and ruled in the airline's favor, but the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
pilots were not barred from pursuing the ADEA claim in a judicial
forum, and that the district court was not required to give deference
to the arbitrator's decision.' 55 The court stated that "[t]he right of
the plaintiffs to go before the [arbitration board] is contractual, aris-
ing out of their collective bargaining agreement. Their right to come
before this court is statutory, arising out of the ADEA."' 6
In Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 5 7 the Tenth Circuit held
that a discharged employee's ADEA claim was not foreclosed by an
discrimination claims, the AAA (American Arbitration Association] issued
Employment Dispute Arbitration Rules, arbitration rules designed
particularly for the purpose of guiding arbitration of individual
discrimination claims. Use of these Rules, which provide for the same
scope of discovery and remedies as would be available in court, would
obviate at least some of the Court's earlier concerns epxressed in
Alexander, Barrentine, and McDonald about the adequacy of arbitration.
Id. at 234 n.4 (Becker, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
153 709 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1983), aft'd, 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
'54 See id. at 546-47.
155 See id. at 547-49. In addition to money damages awarded by the jury, the
district court granted equitable relief in the form of a system-wide injunction against
such discriminatory practices. See ;:. at 547.
156 Id. at 548. The court followed the same analysis the Supreme Court used in
Alexander and Barrentine. In affirming the district court decision, the Ninth Circuit
pointed out the "miniscule" nature of the evidence before the arbitration board
when compared to that before the district court. See id. The plaintiff in Nicholson
cited Criswell to illustrate the inadequacy of arbitration to vindicate statutory rights
under the ADEA:
Had the plaintiffs in Criswell been required to submit their ADEA claims
for final determination before the arbitration board, the procedural
limitations of the arbitration process would have resulted in the denial of
valid ADEA claims and deprived similarly situated pilots of the benefit of
the 'system-wide' relief which was granted by the district court.
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 17, Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir.
1989) (No. 88-5588).
157 836 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1988).
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arbitrator's award. 5 Citing Alexander, Barrentine, and McDonald, the
court ruled that "[b]ecause Congress closely modeled the ADEA
upon Title VII, we similarly deny preclusive effect to arbitral fact-
finding in ADEA claims."'
59
Additionally, the Third Circuit cited Swenson v. Management
Recruiters Int'l, 60 an analogous Title VII case, for support. In Swen-
son, an employee sued her former employer alleging sex discrimina-
tion.' 61 The Eighth Circuit relied upon Alexander to reject the
employer's motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the FAA,
noting:
Although Alexander involves a collective bargaining agreement, and
not a commercial arbitration agreement under the FAA, this fact
should not change the Court's analysis. The Alexander Court was
well aware that federal policy favors arbitration. That decision
turned not on the fact that a collective bargaining arbitration was
involved, but instead on the unique nature of Title VII. Alexander
noted that "Congress indicated that it considered the policy
against discrimination to be of the 'highest priority.' 162
Thus, the court found that "[It]he analysis of Alexander lends strong
support that Congress did not intend federal judicial proceedings in
discrimination cases to be preempted by employment arbitration
agreements enforceable under the FAA."'
163
The Swenson court cited Barrentine to support the proposition
that "certain statutes which provide minimum substantive guaran-
tees . . . are to be treated differently for arbitration purposes.
'' 64
Moreover, the court noted: "Discrimination and civil rights legisla-
tion have traditionally been viewed differently than purely private
economic disputes."' 165 The court also declared that the line of cases
158 See id. at 1553.
159 Id.
160 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 143 (1989).
161 See id.
162 Id. at 1306 (quoting Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47). The dissent in Nicholson
rejected this analysis as based upon a mistrust of arbitration, which has been
proscribed by the Mitsubishi, McMahon, and Rodriguez de Quyjas line of cases. See
Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 235 n.6 (Becker, J., dissenting).
163 Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1306.
164 Id. With reference to Barrentine and the FLSA, it has been noted that
"Congress recognized the significant inequalities in bargaining power that exist
between employers and employees, and accordingly made the FLSA's provisions
mandatory." S. REP. No. 79, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1989).
165 Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1306 (citing R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG,
TREATISE ON CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 15.4 & 15.7
(1986)). The court also rejected the argument that Mitsubishi limited the effect of
Barrentine and Alexander. See id. at 1306 n.4.
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creating a presumption in favor of arbitrability under the FAA,
including McMahon and Mitsubishi, were distinguishable in that none
of them involved employment discrimination claims.' 66 Acknowl-
edging the mandate of Mitsubishi, and without basing its holding
upon the mistrust of arbitration expressed in Alexander, Barrentine,
and McDonald, the court stated:
[I]n the passage of Title VII it was the congressional intent that
arbitration is unable to pay sufficient attention to the transcendent
public interest in the enforcement of Title VII. Title VII mandates
the promotion of the public interest by assisting victims of discrimi-
nation. The arbitration process may hinder efforts to carry out this
mandate. 
16 7
The Swenson court thus concluded that "Alexander makes clear that
Congress intended the right in employment discrimination cases to
have access to judicial remedies to outbalance the federal policy
favoring arbitration. "168
4. The Third Circuit's Conclusion
After examining the text, legislative history, and objectives of
the ADEA, in accordance with the guidelines established by the
Supreme Court in Mitsubishi and McMahon for determining when the
FAA is preempted by another federal statute, the Third Circuit
found that "the right to ajudicial forum under the ADEA is not sub-
ject to displacement by a prospective agreement to arbitrate disputes
contained in individual employment contracts."'" 9 Furthermore, the
166 See id. at 1306 & n.5.
167 Id. at 1307.
168 Id. at 1308-09.
169 Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 230. Professor Shell reached the same conclusion by
taking a slightly different path. Rather than relying upon precedent from the labor
cases, such as Alexander, he contrasted labor arbitration with commercial arbitration
and found that commercial arbitration "is not ... an adequate substitute for the
courts for the resolution of... ADEA claims." Shell, supra note 22, at 517. Thus, he
stated that:
The antidiscrimination purpose of the ADEA, the congressional desire to
track Title VII's substantive provisions, and the statute's focus on
providing both individual remedies and mechanisms for institutional
reform suggest that private arbitration of ADEA claims under the FAA
would conflict with the legislative goals of the statute. As with Title VII
claims, commercial arbitration is focused too narrowly on specific
transactions to give effect to the institutional goals of the ADEA. ...
Finally, cases brought under the ADEA are not purely economic in nature.
Rather, they involve questions of personal dignity and worth that are
precisely the kinds of "core value" questions that should be reserved for a
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court speculated that a contrary holding would induce employers to
follow suit and devise similar employment contracts, "thereby shift-
ing enforcement of the ADEA away from the courts to arbitration. If
this is a result desired by Congress, we should wait for Congress to
explicitly so state." 7'
IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's test for rebutting the presumption of arbi-
trability is extremely difficult to satisfy in a world where realistic chal-
lenges to arbitral competence are proscribed. Apparently
preoccupied by docket-clearing concerns and satisfied that arbitral
fora can vindicate the most fundamental statutory rights, the Court
has dramatically expanded the scope of the FAA, ignoring the possi-
bility that certain types of cases should be excluded from its reach.
Rather than attempting to coordinate the FAA with other important
federal statutes, or reserving a position for the courts involving over-
sight or more substantive review of arbitration proceedings, the
Court, under the slogan of freedom of contract, has dictated the tri-
umph of the FAA, abrogating to arbitrators the responsibility for
protection of a wide range of statutory rights.
Arguments that ADEA cases should be beyond the scope of the
FAA because they require sophisticated statistical expert testimony
and extensive discovery thus have been short-circuited. The Court is
also likely to reject the argument that the right to ajury trial, explic-
itly conferred upon ADEA plaintiffs in the statute, indicates congres-
sional intent to preclude waivers ofjudicial fora for the resolution of
such claims. Such a position, of course, disregards the fact that jury
trials provide an incentive for employees to bring ADEA claims. The
result of the Court's celebration of arbitral competence, which has
been arrived at without factfinding on the issue, thereby threatens to
compromise the substantive rights of claimants, the enforcement of
the statute, and the fulfillment of the statute's purpose-to eliminate
age discrimination.
Discrimination statutes should be interpreted consistently with
each other, and whenever possible, they should be interpreted for
the benefit of the groups protected by them. 1 The Court in Axan-
court. It is thus not stretching too far to assume that Congress meant to
forbid private arbitration of age discrimination claims under the FAA.
Id at 572.
170 Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 231.
171 The "in pari materia rule" of statutory interpretation suggests that,
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der v. Gardner-Denver Co. 172 made such a determination with respect
to Title VII, and suggested that its analysis should apply to other
statutory discrimination claims. Cases that follow in the wake of
Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc. 173 will present an opportunity for the
Supreme Court to limit the presumption of arbitrability to commer-
cial cases and to affirm Alexander's reservation ofjudicial fora for dis-
crimination cases. Such affirmation would allow the courts to
interpret these statutes in order to articulate the norms and public
values they incorporate, and to develop consistent sources of law
pursuant to them.1
74
Deference or delegation to private forum dispute resolution may
be seen from one perspective as an example of freedom from gov-
ernment interference and judicial activism. Viewed from the public
value perspective, and especially considering the relative powerless-
ness of victims of employment discrimination, this delegation repre-
sents an abandonment of the statutory commitment to eradicate
discrimination in our society.'
17
[w]here a federal law is similar to (in pari materia with) another federal
law, the Court will presumptively interpret the former law consistently
with the other and will rely on prior interpretations of one to interpret the
other. The Supreme Court typically explains this rule by reference to the
traditional legal process idea of imputed legislative intent: "[W]here...
Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law,
Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the
interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects
the new statute."
Eskridge, supra note 32, at 1039 (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581
(1978)). In Eskridge's opinion, "this rule is an occasion for the Court to harmonize
statutory policy and to articulate public values." Id. Eskridge also notes the unstated
rule of statutory interpretation that. "[s]tatutes affecting certain discrete and insular
minorities--'Caroene groups'--shall be interpreted, where possible, for the benefit of
those minorities." Id. at 1032.
172 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
173 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989).
174 Professor Shell has stated that "[t]he institutions of commercial arbitration
have demonstrated neither the historical ability nor the desire to resolve disputes so
close to the core of our Nation's values." Shell, supra note 22, at 570. He has
concluded that "commercial arbitration procedures and institutions appear to be
suited to processing claims of economic damage arising from standard commercial
and employment relations, but poorly adapted to resolving disputes touching on
rights to personal dignity and equal protection." Id. at.573.
175 These opposing perspectives are clearly illustrated by comparing the
majority opinion in McMahon with Justice Blackmun's concurrence and dissent. The
majority was perfectly comfortable with assigning disputes related to fraudulent
transactions between securities customers and securities professionals to arbitration
controlled and supervised by securities professionals. See Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 220-42 (1987). In fact, the opinion may
even be read to suggest a celebratory attitude toward such arbitration and its ability
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The Third Circuit suggested in Nicholson that, in the area of
employment discrimination, the courts must not ignore the realities
of the marketplace in reaching conclusions about prospective waivers
of judicial fora. In an era in which fewer workers are protected by
unions and in which there will be increasingly large numbers of older
workers, the courts should monitor employer-employee relations
with, if anything, greater scrutiny than in the past. Moreover, it
seems fair to suggest that Congress, in passing various protective
statutes such as the ADEA, intended the courts to play such a role
when necessary.
A decision by the Supreme Court finding no override of the FAA
in the discrimination laws would indicate that the Court was perfectly
willing to leave enforcement of the discrimination laws to private
sector forces such as arbitration. The Third Circuit suggested that
this willingness was an unsatisfactory resolution of the conflict
between the competing public values of nondiscrimination, on the
one hand, and arbitration on the other. The court therefore sensibly
held that Congress, not the judiciary, should decide whether public
enforcement of the discrimination laws should be subjugated to the
policy endorsing arbitration.
to render justice in such cases. See id. Justice Blackmun, by contrast, was much more
skeptical and wary of this forum, obviously concerned that the substantive rights
conferred by the federal securities laws might not be vindicated there. See id. at 242-
68 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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